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ABSTRACT
Group exponentiation is an important operation used in many
public-key cryptosystems and, more generally, cryptographic pro-
tocols. To expand the applicability of these solutions to computa-
tionally weaker devices, it has been advocated that this operation
is outsourced from a computationally weaker client to a compu-
tationally stronger server, possibly implemented in a cloud-based
architecture. While preliminary solutions to this problem consid-
ered mostly honest servers, or multiple separated servers, some
of which honest, solving this problem in the case of a single (logi-
cal), possibly malicious, server, has remained open since a formal
cryptographic model was introduced in [20]. Several later attempts
either failed to achieve privacy or only bounded by a constant the
(security) probability that a cheating server convinces a client of
an incorrect result.
In this paper we solve this problem for a large class of cyclic
groups, thus making our solutions applicable to many cryptosys-
tems in the literature that are based on the hardness of the discrete
logarithm problem or on related assumptions. Our main protocol
satisies natural correctness, security, privacy and eiciency re-
quirements, where the security probability is exponentially small.
In our main protocol, with very limited oline computation and
server computation, the client can delegate an exponentiation to
an exponent of the same length as a group element by performing
an exponentiation to an exponent of short length (i.e., the length
of a statistical parameter). We also show an extension protocol
that further reduces client computation by a constant factor, while
increasing oline computation and server computation by about
the same factor.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Server-aided cryptography is an active research direction address-
ing the problem of clients delegating or outsourcing cryptographic
computations to servers. Ideas related to this area have circulated
in the literature already many years ago (see, e.g., [9], which intro-
duced ‘wallets with observers' where a third party, such as a bank,
installs hardware on a user's computer to facilitate its future compu-
tations). Recently, this area is seeing an increased interest because of
application scenario like cloud computing (where a client interacts
with a much more powerful server), computations with low-power
devices, such as wireless, RFIDs, etc (where a resource-constrained
client interacts with a more powerful server).
The irst formal model for outsourcing of cryptographic opera-
tions was introduced in [20], where the authors especially studied
outsourcing of modular exponentiation, as this operation is a cor-
nerstone of so many cryptographic protocols. In this model, we
have a client, with an input x , who outsources to one or more
servers the computation of a function F on the client's input, and
the main challenges are:
(1) privacy: only minimal or no information about x should be
revealed to the servers;
(2) security: the servers should not be able, except possibly with
very small probability, to convince the client to accept a
result diferent than F (x); and
(3) eiciency: the client's computation time should be much
smaller than computing F (x) without outsourcing the com-
putation.
In [20], the authors studied secure outsourcing of exponentiation
to 2 servers of which at most one was malicious, and to 1 server,
who was honest on almost all inputs. Since then, the problem of
outsourcing exponentiation to a single, arbitrarily malicious server,
has remained unsolved. This open problem was irst posed in the
original paper [20] and then reiterated in [25]. This is even the case
in a model, as used in all previous work in the area, where relatively
expensive oline computation can be performed and stored on the
client's device. In many proposed protocols, the oline computation
even involves the computation of modular exponentiations with
random exponents, which are envisioned to be computed by an
entity diferent than the client, or pre-computed by the client itself
when additional time or computational power is available. The
model also allows a client to perform in the online phase (a not
large number of) less expensive operations like multiplications,
an assumption that might be reasonable even in computationally
challenged devices, in light of recent advances (see, for instance,
[1], showing how to practically implement group multiplication,
for a speciic group, and a related public-key cryptosystem, using
RFID tags).
Previous results.As also mentioned in [20], a number of solutions
had been proposed, even before their paper introduced a security
model, and then broken in follow-up papers. The single-server
solution from [20] assumes that the server is honest on almost all
inputs.
Other solutions were proposed in more recent papers, but these
solution either only consider a semi-honest server [11], or two
non-colluding servers [10], or do not target input privacy [14], or
only achieve constant security probability (of detecting a cheating
server) [8, 23, 25]. The schemes proposed in [30, 31] do not satisfy
our privacy requirement. Finally, the scheme proposed in [32] does
not satisfy our security requirement.
All mentioned solutions for the outsourcing of exponentiation
are based on pre-computed exponentiations of random exponents,
which are somehow stored on the client machine in an oline phase.
These exponentiations might be precomputed by another party and
stored on the client's device, or might be computed by the client
itself using a pseudo-random power generator. One such generator
was proposed by combining the results in [6, 24], based on a hidden-
subset-sum hardness assumption, although this assumption needs
to be re-evaluated in light of the most recent attacks.
The literature of course contains several elegant general-purpose
solutions, applicable to any polynomial-time computable function,
and starting with [17], which uses garbled circuits [26] and fully-
homomorphic encryption [18] to eiciently, privately and securely
outsource any polynomial-time circuit to a single (semi-honest)
server. Due to their generality, these solutions are only asymptoti-
cally eicient, but not so in practical settings, and are thus out of
scope in this paper.
Our Contributions. In this paper we irst of all provide rigorous
deinitions, mainly based on [17] as well as [20], for the require-
ments of correctness, privacy, security and eiciency for outsourced
computation protocols in the single, malicious, server model, with
an allowed of-line phase.
In this model, we construct protocols that provably satisfy these
requirements while delegating, to a single malicious server, group
exponentiation, for a large class of cyclic groups, including groups
often used for cryptosystems with provable security under the
Discrete Logarithm or related assumptions. All protocols satisfy
security with probability exponentially small in a statistical secu-
rity parameter λ (which can be set equal to, for instance, 128). Our
protocols' privacy and security properties do not rely on any ad-
ditional complexity assumptions, as the adversary corrupting the
server is not limited to run in polynomial time. Our protocols dele-
gate function Fexp,д,q (x) = д
x (i.e., variable-exponent, ixed-base
exponentiation over an arbitrary cyclic group G).
Our main protocol (in Section 3) delegates exponentiation in
cyclic groups to a single, possibly malicious, server. The client
delegates an exponentiation with an exponent as long as a group
element (e.g., of σ = 2048 bits), while only performing a single
exponentiation with a much smaller exponent (e.g., of λ = 128
bits). Both the oline phase and the server in the online phase only
require 2 exponentiations with σ -bit exponents. It is based on a
1-round probabilistic veriication of the server's computation, and
satisies information-theoretic privacy, and security with exponen-
tially small probability 2−λ of the malicious server fooling the client.
The main technical idea is simultaneously enforcing a probabilistic
veriication equation (veriiable using less than 2λ group multipli-
cations), a deterministic inequality check and a group membership
protocol (veriiable using no more than 1 group multiplication),
given 2 correct exponentiations available to the client in an oline
phase.
Our second protocol, presented in Section 4, extends the protocol
in Section 3 to achieve the following (tunable) eiciency tradeof: it
further reduces the number of the client's group multiplications,
while increasing the number of group exponentiations of random
exponents performed during the oline phase and the number of
the server's group exponentiations. Here, the main technical idea
consists of running multiple probabilistic veriication equations
with smaller exponents at a performance cost for the client smaller
than independently running each of the equations.
As in all previous work in the area, we consider a model with
an oline phase, where a client can precompute exponentiations
to random exponents, or another party can precompute them and
store them on the client's device. Alternatively, if their hidden-
subset-sum assumption holds when run with a low number of
multiplications, the pseudo-random power generator from [6, 24]
could be used.
2 NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
In this section we formally deine outsourcing protocols, and their
correctness, security, privacy and eiciency requirements, mainly
building on the deinitional approach from [17], as well as the one
from [20]. We also introduce group notations and deinitions that
will be used in the rest of the paper. We start with some basic
notations.
Basic notations. The expression y ← T denotes the probabilis-
tic process of randomly and independently choosing y from set
T . The expression y ← A(x1,x2, . . .) denotes the (possibly proba-
bilistic) process of running algorithm A on input x1,x2, . . . and any
necessary random coins, and obtaining y as output. The expres-
sion (zA, zB ) ← (A(x1,x2, . . .),B(y1,y2, . . .)) denotes the (possibly
probabilistic) process of running an interactive protocol between A,
taking as input x1,x2, . . . and any necessary random coins, and B,
taking as input y1,y2, . . . and any necessary random coins, where
zA, zB are A and B's inal outputs, respectively, at the end of this
protocol's execution.
System scenario, entities, and protocol.We consider a system
with two types of parties: clients and servers, where a client's
computational resources are expected to be more limited than a
server's ones, and therefore clients are interested in delegating (or
outsourcing) the computation of speciic functions to servers. In
all our solutions, we consider a single client, denoted as C , and a
single server, denoted as S . We assume that the communication link
between each client and S is private or not subject to conidential-
ity, integrity, or replay attacks, and note that such attacks can be
separately addressed using known techniques in cryptography and
security. As in all previous work in the area, we consider a model
with an oline phase, where exponentiations to random exponents
can be precomputed and made somehow available to the client. This
model has been justiied in several ways, all appealing to diferent
application settings. In the presence of a trusted party (say, setting
up the client's device), the trusted party can simply perform the
precomputed exponentiations and store them on the client's device.
If no trusted party is available, in the presence of a pre-processing
phase where the client's device does not have signiicant compu-
tation constraints, the client can itself perform the precomputed
exponentiations and store them on its own device. Clients that
always have signiicant computation constraints could spend more
preprocessing time or use the pseudo-random power generator
from [6, 24], which, based on a hidden-subset-sum assumption,
only performs a relatively smaller number of group multiplications,
to generate a new exponentiation for a pseudo-random exponent.
Here, we note that this latter assumption needs to be re-evaluated
in light of recent attacks. For simplicity of description, we will
consider an Oline algorithm executed by either a trusted party or
a client with no signiicant computation constraints, and remark
any changes in our results when this algorithm is executed using a
pseudo-random power generator.
Let σ denote the computational security parameter (i.e., the
parameter derived from hardness considerations on the underlying
computational problem), and let λ denote the statistical security
parameter (i.e., a parameter such that evens with probability 2−λ are
extremely rare). Both parameters are expressed in unary notation
(i.e., 1σ , 1λ ). When performing numerical performance analysis, we
use σ = 2048 and λ = 128, as these are currently the most often
recommended parameter settings in cryptographic protocols and
applications.
Let F : Dom(F ) → CoDom(F ) be a function, where Dom(F )
denotes F 's domain,CoDom(F ) denotes F 's co-domain, and desc(F )
denotes F 's description. Assumingdesc(F ) is known to bothC and S ,
and input x is known only toC , we deine a client-server protocol for
the outsourced computation of F in the presence of an oline phase
as a 2-party, 2-phase, communication protocol between C and S ,
denoted as (C(1σ , 1λ ,desc(F ),x), S(1σ , 1λ ,desc(F ))), and consisting
of the following steps:
(1) pp ← Oline(1σ , 1λ ,desc(F )),
(2) (yC ,yS ) ← (C(1
σ , 1λ ,desc(F ),pp,x), S(1σ , 1λ ,desc(F )).
As discussed above, Step 1 is executed in an oline phase, when the
input x to the function F is not yet available. Step 2 is executed in
the online phase, when the input x to the function F is available to
C . At the end of both phases,C learns yC (intended to be = y) and S
learnsyS (usually an empty string in this paper). We will often omit
desc(F ), 1σ , 1λ for brevity of description. Executions of outsourced
computation protocols can happen sequentially (each execution
starting after the previous one is inished), or concurrently (S runs
at the same time one execution with each one of many clients).
Correctness Requirement. Informally, the (natural) correctness
requirement states that if both parties follow the protocol,C obtains
some output at the end of the protocol, and this output is, with high
probability, equal to the value obtained by evaluating function F
on C's input. A formal deinition follows.
Deinition 2.1. Let σ , λ be the security parameters, let F be a
function, and let (C, S) be a client-server protocol for the outsourced
computation of F . We say that (C, S) satisies δc -correctness if for
any x in F 's domain, it holds that
Prob
[
out ← CorrExpF(1
σ
, 1λ) : out = 1
]
≥ δc ,
for some δc close to 1, where experiment CorrExp is detailed below:
CorrExpF(1
σ , 1λ)
1. pp ← Oline(desc(F ))
2. (yC ,yS ) ← (C(pp,x), S)
3. if yC = F (x) then return: 1
else return: 0
Security Requirement. Informally, the most basic security re-
quirement would state the following: if C follows the protocol, a
malicious adversary corrupting S cannot convince C to obtain, at
the end of the protocol, some output y′ diferent from the value
y obtained by evaluating function F on C's input x . To deine a
stronger and more realistic security requirement, we augment the
adversary's power so that the adversary can even choose C's input
x , before attempting to convince C of an incorrect output. We also
do not restrict the adversary to run in polynomial time. A formal
deinition follows.
Deinition 2.2. Let σ , λ be the security parameters, let F be a
function, and let (C, S) be a client-server protocol for the outsourced
computation of F . We say that (C, S) satisies ϵs -security against a
malicious adversary if for any algorithm A, it holds that
Prob
[
out ← SecExpF,A(1
σ
, 1λ) : out = 1
]
≤ ϵs ,
for some ϵs close to 0, where experiment SecExp is detailed below:
SecExpF,A(1
σ , 1λ)
1. pp ← Oline(desc(F ))
2. (x ,aux) ← A(desc(F ))
3. (y′,aux) ← (C(pp,x),A(aux))
4. if y′ =⊥ or y′ = F (x) then return: 0
else return: 1.
PrivacyRequirement. Informally, the privacy requirement should
guarantee the following: if C follows the protocol, a malicious ad-
versary corrupting S cannot obtain any information aboutC's input
x from a protocol execution. This is formalized by extending the
indistinguishability-based approach typically used in formal def-
initions for encryption schemes. That is, the adversary can pick
two inputs x0,x1, then one of these two inputs is chosen at random
and used by C in the protocol with the adversary acting as S , and
then the adversary tries to guess which input was used by C . As
for security, we do not restrict the adversary to run in polynomial
time. A formal deinition follows.
Deinition 2.3. Let σ , λ be the security parameters, let F be a
function, and let (C, S) be a client-server protocol for the outsourced
computation of F . We say that (C, S) satisies ϵp -privacy (in the
sense of indistinguishability) against a malicious adversary if for any
algorithm A, it holds that
Prob
[
out ← PrivExpF,A(1
σ
, 1λ) : out = 1
]
≤ ϵp ,
for some ϵp close to 0, where experiment PrivExp is detailed below:
PrivExpF,A(1
σ , 1λ)
1. pp ← Oline(desc(F ))
2. (x0,x1,aux) ← A(desc(F ))
3. b ← {0, 1}
4. (y′,d) ← (C(pp,xb ),A(aux))
5. if b = d then return: 1
else return: 0.
Eiciency Metrics and Requirements. Let (C, S) be a client-
server protocol for the outsourced computation of function F . We
say that (C, S) has eiciency parameters (tF , tP , tC , tS , cc,mc), if F
can be computed (without outsourcing) using tF (σ , λ) atomic op-
erations, C can be run in the oline phase using tP (σ , λ) atomic
operations and in the online phase using tC (σ , λ) atomic operations,
S can be run using tS (σ , λ) atomic operations, C and S exchange
a total of at mostmc messages, of total length at most cc . In our
analysis, we only consider the most expensive group operations
as atomic operations (e.g., group multiplications and/or exponen-
tiation), and neglect lower-order operations (e.g., equality testing,
additions and subtractions between group elements). While we
naturally try to minimize all these protocol eiciency metrics, our
main goal is to design protocols where
(1) tC (σ , λ) << tF (σ , λ), and
(2) tS (σ , λ) is not signiicantly larger than tF (σ , λ),
based on the underlying assumption, consistent with the state of the
art in cryptographic implementations at least for many group types,
that group multiplication requires signiicantly less computing
resources than group exponentiation.
Group notations and deinitions. Let (G,×) be a group, let σ be
its computational security parameter, and let L denote the length
of the binary representation of elements in G. Typically, in crypto-
graphic applications we set L as about equal to σ .
We also assume that (G,×) is cyclic, has order q, and denote as д
one of its generators. By y = дx we denote the exponentiation (inG)
of д to the x-th power; i.e., the value y ∈ G such that д× · · · ×д = y,
where the multiplication operation × is applied x − 1 times. Let
Zq = {0, 1, . . . ,q − 1}, and let Fexp,д,q : Zq → G denote the func-
tion that maps every x ∈ Zq to the exponentiation (inG) of д to the
x-th power. By desc(Fexp,д,q ) we denote a conventional descrip-
tion of the function Fexp,д,q that includes its semantic meaning as
well as generator д, order q and the eicient algorithms computing
multiplication and inverses inG . By texp (ℓ) we denote a parameter
denoting the number of multiplications in G used to compute an
exponentiation (in G) of a group value to an arbitrary ℓ-bit expo-
nent. By tm,exp (ℓ) we denote a parameter denoting the number of
multiplications in G used to computem exponentiations (in G) of
the same group value tom arbitrary ℓ-bit exponents.
We deine an eiciently veriiable membership protocol for G as
a one-message protocol, denoted as the pair (mProve,mVerify) of
algorithms, satisfying
• completeness: for anyw ∈ G, mVerify(w ,mProve(w))=1;
• soundness: for anyw < G, and any mProve′,
mVerify(w ,mProve′(w))=0;
• eicient veriiability: the number of multiplications tmVerify(σ )
in G executed by mVerify is o(texp );
• eicient provability: the number of multiplications tmProve(σ ) in
G executed by mProve is not signiicantly larger than texp .
We say that a group is eicient if its description is short (i.e., has
length polynomial in σ ), its associated operation × and the inverse
operation are eicient (i.e., they can be executed in time polyno-
mial in σ ), and it has an eiciently veriiable membership protocol.
Note that for essentially all cyclic groups frequently used in cryp-
tography, the description is short and its associated × and inverse
operations can be run in time polynomial in σ . The only non-trivial
property to establish is whether the group has an eiciently verii-
able membership protocol. In the rest of the paper we present our
results for any arbitrary eicient cyclic group, of which we now
show two examples that are often used in cryptography and that
do have eiciently veriiable membership protocols.
Example 1: (G,×) = (Z∗p , · mod p), for a large prime p. This group
was one of the most recommended for early foundational crypto-
graphic schemes like the Blum-Micali pseudo-random generator
[5], etc. Note that multiplication and inverses modulo p can be
computed in time polynomial in logp, and an eiciently veriiable
membership protocol goes as follows:
(1) on inputw , mProve does nothing;
(2) on inputw , mVerify returns 1 if 0 < w < p and 0 otherwise.
The completeness, soundness, eicient provability properties of this
protocol are easily seen to hold. The eicient veriiability property
follows by noting that mVerify runs in time linear in logp, which
is strictly smaller than the time for exponentiation mod p (in fact,
even the time for multiplication mod p).
Example 2: (G,×) = (Gq , · mod p), for large primes p,q such that
p = 2q + 1, where Gq is the q-order subgroup of Z
∗
p . This group is
one of the most recommended for cryptographic schemes like the
Di e-Hellman protocol [15], El-Gamal encryption [16], Cramer-
Shoup encryption [12], etc. It is known that Gq is cyclic and is
characterized as the set of quadratic residues modulo p; i.e., the set
of z ∈ Z∗p for which there exists an r ∈ Z
∗
p such that z = r
2 mod p.
Using results from [13] based on this characterization, an eiciently
veriiable membership protocol can be built as follows:
(1) on input w , mProve computes r = w(q+1)/2 mod p and
returns r ;
(2) on input w, r , mVerify returns 1 if w = r2 mod p and 0
otherwise.
The completeness and soundness properties of this protocol are
easily seen to hold. The eicient provability follows by noting
that mProve only performs 1 exponentiation mod p. The eicient
veriiability property follows by noting that mVerify only requires
one multiplication mod p.
3 OUTSOURCING EXPONENTIATION IN ANY
EFFICIENT CYCLIC GROUP
In this section we present our irst and main protocol for outsourc-
ing exponentiation in cyclic groups. We irst formally state our re-
sult, then informally and formally describe the protocol, and inally
prove its correctness, security, privacy and eiciency properties.
Formal theorem statement.We obtain the following
Theorem 3.1. Let (G,×) be an eicient cyclic group, let σ be its
computational security parameter, and let λ be a statistical security
parameter. There exists (constructively) a client-server protocol
(C, S) for outsourcing the computation of function Fexp,д,q , which
satisies
1. δc -correctness, for δc = 1;
2. ϵs -security, for ϵs = 2
−λ ;
3. ϵp -privacy, for ϵp = 0;
4. eiciency with parameters (tF , tS , tP , tC , cc,mc), where
• tF is = texp (σ );
• tS is = 2 texp (σ ) + 2 tmProve(σ );
• tP is = 2 texp (σ ), with random exponents from Zq ;
• tC is ≤ texp (λ)+ 2 tmVerify(σ )+ 2 multiplications inG and
1 multiplication in Zq ;
• cc = 4 elements in G andmc = 2.
The main takeaway from Theorem 3.1 is that C outsources the
computation of an exponentiation with a σ -bit exponent to S while
C only performs an exponentiation with a λ-bit exponent, 2 group
membership veriications inG , 2 multiplications inG and 1 modular
multiplication inZq . Also remarkable are the running time of S , who
only performs 2 exponentiations and 2 group membership proof
generations inG , and of the oline phase, where only 2 known-base
exponentiations with random exponents are needed. Finally, the
protocol only requires 2 messages, which is clearly minimal in this
model, and only requires the communication of 4 elements in G.
Informal description of protocol (C, S). The main challenge in
coming up with our desired protocol consists of allowing C to
eiciently verify computations performed by the possibly malicious
server. It should be noted that general conversion techniques are
known in the cryptography literature to transform a protocol secure
against a honest party into one secure against a malicious one.
Typically, these techniques are based on zero-knowledge proofs of
knowledge of secrets that certify the correctness of the computation
[19]. In their most general version, these techniques do not perform
well with respect to many eiciency metrics. Even considering their
most simpliied version, basic proofs of knowledge of exponents
in the literature (such as, e.g., [9]) require the veriier to perform
group exponentiations, which is precisely what the client is trying
to delegate. Accordingly, we need a substantially diferent protocol
technique to allow the client's eicient veriication of the server's
computations.
Our main idea consists of a probabilistic veriication equation
which is veriiable using only a small number of modular multipli-
cations. More speciically, C injects an additional random element
in the inputs on which S is asked to compute the value of function
F , so to satisfy the following properties: (a) if S returns correct
computations of F , thenC can use these random values to correctly
computey; (b) if S returns incorrect computations of F , then S either
does not meet some deterministic veriication equation or can only
meet C's probabilistic veriication equation for one possible value
of the random elements; (c) C's messages hide the values of the
random element as well as C's input to the function. By choosing
a large enough domain (i.e., {1, . . . , 2λ }) from which this random
value is chosen, the protocol achieves a very small security proba-
bility (i.e., 2−λ ). As this domain is much smaller thanG , this results
in a considerable eiciency gain on C's running time.
Our probabilistic veriication equation involves the answer from
S , a correct exponentiation available to C (and computed in an
oline phase byC or another trusted party), and the potential func-
tion output computed using the answer from S and another correct
exponentiation computed in the oline phase. Only one of these
values is exponentiated byC , and to an exponent that is ≤ 2λ , which
can be much smaller than |G |. In itself, this probabilistic test is not
always successful, but we characterize the condition under which
it fails, and this condition can be expressed as 2 computationally
simple deterministic tests: a value distinctness test and a group
membership test.
The value distinctness test can be eiciently veriied by C with
no exponentiation or multiplication in G, but it introduces a mi-
nor case (i.e., C's input is = 0) where the probabilistic test is not
passed; however, in this case, to preserve the protocol's correct-
ness, C calculates the function Fexp,д,q by himself (i.e., by setting
Fexp,д,q (0) = д
0
= 1), and ignores all other veriications.
The groupmembership test is realized via the assumed eiciently
veriiable group membership protocol. While we do not know of
such a protocol for any arbitrary cyclic group, we showed in Sec-
tion 2 that groups commonly used in cryptography have one.
Formal description of protocol (C, S). LetG be an eicient cyclic
group, and let (mProve,mVerify) denote its eiciently veriiable
membership protocol.
Input to S: 1σ , 1λ , desc(Fexp,д,q )
Input to C: 1σ , 1λ , desc(Fexp,д,q ), x ∈ Zq
Oline phase instructions:
(1) Randomly choose ui ∈ Zq , for i = 0, 1
(2) Set vi = д
ui and store (ui ,vi ) on C , for i = 0, 1
Online phase instructions:
(1) C randomly chooses b ∈ {1, . . . , 2λ }
C sets z0 := (x − u0) mod q, z1 := (b · x + u1) mod q
C sends z0, z1 to S
(2) S computeswi := д
zi and πi :=mProve(wi ), for i = 0, 1
S sendsw0,w1,π0,π1 to C
(3) If x = 0
C returns: y = 1 and the protocol halts
if mVerify(wi ,πi ) = 0 for some i ∈ {0, 1}, then
C returns: ⊥ and the protocol halts
C computes y := w0 ∗v0
C checks that
y , 1, also called the ‘distinctness test'
w1 = y
b ∗v1, also called the ‘probabilistic test'
mVerify(w0,π0) = mVerify(w1,π1) = 1,
also called the ‘membership test'
if any one of these tests is not satisied then
C returns: ⊥ and the protocol halts
C returns: y
Properties of protocol (C, S): The eiciency properties are veriied
by protocol inspection.
• Round complexity: the protocol only requires one round, con-
sisting of one message from C to S followed by one message
from S to C .
• Communication complexity: the protocol requires the transfer
of 2 elements in G and 2 proofs of group membership from
S to C , and 2 elements in Zq from C to S .
• Runtime complexity: During the oline phase, 2 exponenti-
ations in base д and with random σ -bit exponents are per-
formed. Note that known-base exponentiations can be exe-
cuted faster than unknown-base ones using pre-computation
techniques (see, e.g.,[7, 22]). During the online phase, S com-
putes 2 exponentiations to σ -bit exponents inG and 2 group
membership proofs; and C veriies 2 group membership
proofs and computes 2 multiplications in G, 1 modular mul-
tiplication in Zq , and 1 exponentiation in G to a random
exponent that is much smaller (≤ 2λ ) than 2σ .
The correctness property follows by showing that if C and S
follow the protocol, C always outputs y = дx . First, assume x = 0;
in this case, C returns y = 1 = д0 at the beginning of step 3. Now,
assuming x , 0, we show that the 3 tests performed by C are
always passed. The membership test is always passed sincewi is
computed by S as дzi , for i = 0, 1, and д is a generator of group G;
the probabilistic test is always passed since
w1 = д
z1
= дbx+u1 = (дx )bдu1 = ybv1.
The distinctness test is always passed, since we assume x , 0,
which implies that −u0 , (x −u0) mod q, which implies, using the
fact that д is a generator and has thus order q, that v−10 = д
−u0 ,
дx−u0 = дz0 = w0, equivalently saying that y = w0 ∗ v0 , 1. This
implies that C never returns ⊥, and thus returns y. To see that this
returned value y is the correct output, note that
y = w0 ∗v0 = д
z0 ∗ дu0 = дx−u0 ∗ дu0 = дx .
The privacy property of the protocol against any arbitrary ma-
licious S follows by observing that C's only message to S does
not leak any information about x . This message is a pair (z0, z1)
where z0 = (x − u0) mod q, z1 = (bx + u1) mod q, and z0 and
z1 are uniformly and independently distributed in Zq , as so are u0
and u1. Then, no information is leaked by z0, z1 about x as: (a) for
any x ∈ Zq , there is exactly one u0 corresponding to z0; that is,
u0 = x − z0 mod q; (b) for any x ∈ Zq , for any b ∈ {1, . . . , 2
λ }
chosen by C , there is exactly one u1 corresponding to z1; that is,
u1 = z1 − bx mod q. This implies that, since u0,u1 are uniformly
and independently distributed in Zq , the distribution of x condi-
tioned on z0, z1 is also uniform in Zq . Moreover, by essentially the
same proof, protocol (C, S) satisies the following property: for any
x , z0 and z1 do not leak any information about b. We will use this
latter privacy property in the proof of the security property.
To prove the security property against any malicious S we need
to compute an upper bound ϵs on the security probability that S
convinces C to output a y such that y , Fexp,д,q (x). If x = 0, C
can calculate Fexp,д,q (x) = д
0
= 1 and it does not need to check
whether S is honest or dishonest. Thus ϵs = 0 when x = 0. Now
assume that x , 0. We start by deining the following events with
respect to a random execution of (C, S) where C uses x as input:
• ey,,, deined as ‘C outputs y such that y , Fexp,д,q (x)'
• e⊥, deined as ‘C outputs ⊥'
By inspection of (C, S), we directly obtain the following fact.
Fact 3.1. If event ey,, happens then event (¬ e⊥) happens.
With respect to a random execution of (C, S) where C uses x as
input, we now deine the following events:
• e1,b , deined as ‘∃ exactly oneb such that S 's message (w0,w1)
satisiesw1 = (w0 ∗v0)
b ∗v1'
• e>1,b , deined as ‘∃ more than one b such that S's message
(w0,w1) satisiesw1 = (w0 ∗v0)
b ∗v1'.
By deinition, events e1,b , e>1,b are each other's complement event.
In our proof of the privacy property of (C, S), we proved that for
any x , C's message (z0, z1) does not leak any information about b.
This implies that all values in {1, . . . , 2λ } are still equally likely even
when conditioning over message (z0, z1). Then, if event e1,b is true,
the probability that S's message (w0,w1) satisies the probabilistic
test, is 1 divided by the number 2λ of values ofb that are still equally
likely even when conditioning over message (z0, z1). We obtain the
following
Fact 3.2. Prob
[
¬ e⊥ |e1,b
]
≤ 1/2λ
We now show the main technical claim, saying that if S is ma-
licious then it cannot produce in step 2 of the protocol values
w ′0,w
′
1 satisfying all of C's 3 tests relatively to two distinct values
b1,b2 ∈ {1, . . . , 2
λ }:
Since S can be malicious, in step 2 it can send arbitrary values to
C . Diferently saying, C can send w ′i for i = 0, 1 for w
′
i = wi or
w ′i , wi , wherewi = д
zi . Since the groupG is cyclic, д is generator
of G and C uses π0,π1 to check in step 3 thatw
′
i ∈ G , we can write
w ′0 = д
u ∗w0 andw
′
1 = д
v ∗w1 for some u,v ∈ Zq
then y = w ′0 ∗ v0 = д
u ∗ w0 ∗ v0 = д
u ∗ дx . Now, recall that the
goal of a malicious S is to passC's three veriication tests and force
C's output to be y , дx ; then, assume that u , 0 mod q. Now,
consider the following equivalent rewritings of C's probabilistic
test, obtained by variable substitutions and simpliications:
w ′1 = y
b ∗v1
дv ∗w1 = (д
u ∗ дx )b ∗ дu1
дv ∗ дz1 = дub ∗ дbx+u1
дv ∗ дbx+u1 = дub ∗ дbx+u1
дv = дub
v = ub mod q.
Notice that if u = 0 mod q then the above calculation implies that
v = 0 mod q, and thus S is honest, from which we derive that
ϵs = 0. Now consider the case S is dishonest, in which case we have
that u , 0 mod q. We want to show that b is unique in this case.
If there exist two distinct b1 and b2 such that
ub1 = v mod q and ub2 = v mod q
then u(b1 − b2) = 0 mod q then b1 − b2 = 0 mod q (i.e b1 = b2)
because u , 0 mod q. This shows that b is unique.
We obtain the following fact.
Fact 3.3. Prob
[
e>1,b
]
= 0
The rest of the proof consists of computing an upper bound ϵs on
the probability of event ey,,. We have the following
Prob
[
ey,,
]
≤ Prob [ ¬ e⊥ ]
= Prob
[
e1,b
]
· Prob
[
¬ e⊥ |e1,b
]
+ Prob
[
e>1,b
]
· Prob
[
¬ e⊥ |e>1,b
]
= Prob
[
e1,b
]
· Prob
[
¬ e⊥ |e1,b
]
≤ Prob
[
e1,b
]
·
1
2λ
≤
1
2λ
,
where the irst inequality follows from Fact 3.1, the irst equality
follows from the deinition of events e1,b , e>1,b and the condition-
ing rule, the second equality follows from Fact 3.3, and the second
inequality follows from Fact 3.2.
We inally obtain that ϵs = Prob
[
ey,,
]
= 2−λ , which concludes
the proof for the security property for (C, S). □
Remark. Although we have only analyzed our protocol (C, S) with
respect to a single execution, we note that the proofs of its proper-
ties naturally extend to multiple sequential, parallel or concurrent
executions of the same protocol (both oline and online phase).
4 OUTSOURCING EXPONENTIATION IN ANY
EFFICIENT CYCLIC GROUPWITH
TRADEOFF RUNTIME PERFORMANCE
In this section we present our second protocol for outsourcing
exponentiation in cyclic groups. This protocol can be seen as an
extension of the irst protocol, from Section 3, trying to further
reduce the client's runtime, even at the cost of slightly increas-
ing other computation metrics. The underlying motivation here is
that in many applications slightly increasing a cloud server's time
complexity may be worth to obtain further reduced client's time
complexity. We irst formally state this subsection's result, then
describe the protocol, and inally prove its correctness, security,
privacy and eiciency properties.
Formal theorem statement.We actually show a class of proto-
cols varying according to a parameterm ≥ 1, where in the case
m = 1 we have the same protocol as in Section 3. Formally, we
show the following
Theorem 4.1. Let (G, ∗) be an eicient cyclic group, let σ be
its computational security parameter, let λ be a statistical security
parameters, let integer m be a protocol parameter, and let λ′ =
⌈λ/m⌉. There exists (constructively) a client-server protocol (C, S)
for outsourced computation of function Fexp,д,q which satisies
1. δc -correctness, for δc = 1;
2. ϵs -security, for ϵs = 2
−λ ;
3. ϵp -privacy, for ϵp = 0;
4. eiciency with parameters (tF , tS , tP , tC , cc,mc), where
• tF is = texp (σ );
• tS is = tm+1,exp (σ ) + (m + 1) · tmProve(σ );
• tP is = tm+1,exp (σ );
• tC is = tm,exp (λ
′) + (m + 1) multiplications in G +m mul-
tiplications in Zq + (m + 1) · tmVerify(σ );
• cc =m+1 elements in Zq ,m+1 elements and membership
proofs in G;
• mc = 2.
The main takeaway from Theorem 4.1 is that C delegates an ex-
ponentiation with a σ -bit exponent to S while C only performsm
same-base exponentiations with a λ′-bit exponent,m + 1 multipli-
cations and group membership veriications in G andm modular
multiplications in Zq . Here, note that exponent λ
′ is ⌈λ/m⌉, and
that m same-base exponentiations can be performed faster than
independently repeating m times the same exponentiation algo-
rithm, by using optimized algorithms. The protocol still requires
only 2 messages, which is minimal in this model. On the other hand,
the running time of S has increased, in that S now performsm + 1
exponentiations and generatesm + 1 group membership proofs in
G . Similarly, the running time of the oline phase has increased, as
nowm + 1 known-base exponentiations with random exponents
are needed. The communication complexity also has increased to
m + 1 elements in Zq andm + 1 elements inG . While these latter 3
metrics increase with respect to the protocol in Section 3, it should
be noted that parameterm can be chosen by the system designer,
to select the desired tradeof (as further discussed in Section 5).
Informal description of protocol (C, S). In Section 3 we pre-
sented a protocol which satisies δc -correctness, ϵp -privacy and
ϵs -security, with δc = 1, ϵp = 0, and ϵs = 2
−λ , with the following
running time parameters: tC ≤ texp (λ) + 2 group multiplications,
tS = 2 group exponentiations, and tP = 2 group exponentiations.
In this section we design protocols that further decrease the value
of tC while keeping the same values for δc , ϵp , ϵs , and only slightly
increasing tS , tP .
Themain idea in our new protocol is based on a detailed consider-
ation of the role of the probabilistic veriication equation ‘w = ybv'
in the protocol of Section 3. Speciically, it is possible to usem > 1
such equations, each with the same base y and an independent
value of the random exponent b(i), while:
(1) the worst-case number of C's multiplications increases by a
factor strictly smaller thanm;
(2) the security analysis performed using a single probabilistic
veriication equation can be extended to allm equations, thus
reducing the security probability by an exponential factor
ofm.
Then, since it suices to target a security probability of 2−λ for
the resulting protocol, we can choose a smaller, by a factor of
m, domain (i.e., {1, . . . , 2 ⌈λ/m ⌉ − 1}) for the random exponents
b(1), . . . ,b(m). The eiciency gain is in the observation that per-
formingm probabilistic veriications can require a number of C's
group multiplication smaller thanm times those needed in a sin-
gle probabilistic veriication. This is because any preprocessing
techniques, including those described in [7, 27], can be run on-
line and become efective if used to compute multiple same-base
exponentiations. On the other hand, performing m probabilistic
veriication equations requiresm+1 oline exponentiations fromC
andm+1 exponentiations from S (here, a directm-fold repetition of
the protocol from Section 3 would actually incur a number of 2m ex-
ponentiations but we reduce this number tom+1 by observing that
the security property continues to hold even when using the same
w0 across allm equations). The actual eiciency tradeof achieved
by the resulting protocol (i.e., the reduction in the number of C's
group multiplications and the increase in the number of oline
exponentiations to random exponents and S 's exponentiations) will
vary depending on the speciic algorithm used to computem same-
base exponentiations. In what follows, we describe protocol (C,S)
based on a generic multiple-exponentiation algorithm and prove
its correctness, privacy and security properties. Later, in Section 5,
we analyze the protocol's performance metrics based on speciic
instantiations of this algorithm, and for diferent values ofm (which
can be chosen by the system designer to calibrate the tradeof); in
particular, we show thatm = 5 minimizes the number tC of C's
group multiplications.
Formal description of protocol (C, S).
Let ManyExp(z,x(1), . . . ,x(s), β) denote an algorithm that, on in-
put z ∈ G and exponents x(1), . . . ,x(s) ∈ {1, . . . , 2β }, computes
exponentiations zx (1), . . . , zx (s) inG . Algorithm ManyExp could be
instantiated using s executions of the textbook square-and-multiply
algorithm, or using improved techniques based on precomputations
(here perfomed in the online phase), such as those from [7, 22, 27].
Letm be a protocol parameter that can be chosen by the system
designer, and let λ′ = ⌈λ/m⌉.
Input to S: 1σ , 1λ , desc(Fexp,д,q ), parameter 1
m
Input to C: 1σ , 1λ , desc(Fexp,д,q ), x ∈ Zq , parameter 1
m
Oline phase instructions:
1. Uniformly choose u0, . . . ,um ∈ Zq
2. Run algorithm ManyExp(д,u0,u1, . . . ,um ,σ )
to compute (v0,v1, . . . ,vm )
3. Store (u0,v0), (u1,v1), . . . , (um ,vm ) on C
Online phase instructions:
1. C sets z0 = (x − u0) mod q
For i = 1, . . . ,m,
C uniformly chooses b(i) ∈ {1, . . . , 2λ
′
}
C sets zi = (b(i) · x + ui ) mod q
C sends z0, z1, . . . , zm to S
2. S runs algorithm ManyExp(д, z0, z1, . . . , zm ,σ )
to compute (w0,w1, . . . ,wm )
For j = 0, . . . ,m,
S computes πj = mProve(w j )
S sends (w0,π0), (w1,π1), . . . , (wm ,πm ) to C
3. If x = 0
C returns: y = 1 and the protocol halts
C computes y = w0 ∗v0
C checks that y , 1, also called the ‘distinctness test'
C checks that mVerify(wi ,πi ) =1, for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m,
also called the ‘membership test'
C runs ManyExp(y,b(1), . . . ,b(m), λ′)
to compute yb(1), . . . ,yb(m)
For i = 1, . . . ,m,
C checks thatwi = y
b(i) ∗vi ,
also called the ‘i-th probabilistic test'
if any one of the above checks is not satisied then
C returns: ⊥ and the protocol halts.
4. C returns: y
Properties of protocol (C, S): The eiciency properties are veriied
by protocol inspection.
• Round complexity. The protocol only requires one round, con-
sisting of one message from C to S followed by one message
from S to C .
• Communication complexity. The protocol requires the trans-
fer ofm + 1 elements inG and membership proofs from S to
C andm + 1 elements in Zq from C to S .
• Runtime complexity. Only ≤ m+ 1 exponentiations inG with
the same base and random σ -bit exponents are performed
during the oline phase. During the online phase, S computes
m + 1 exponentiations in G with the same base and random
σ -bit exponents, and m + 1 membership proofs, while C
performsm multiplications in Zq ,m + 1 multiplications in
G,m + 1 membership proof veriications and computesm
exponentiations in G with the same base and random λ′-bit
exponents.
The correctness property follows by showing that ifC and S follow
the protocol, C always outputs y = дx . This is proved for the case
x = 0 exactly as done for the protocol in Section 3. Then, assume
x , 0. We can prove that C passes the G-membership test and the
distinctness test exactly as done for the protocol in Section 3. Even
the i-th probabilistic test is passed, for all i = 1, . . . ,m, since
wi = д
zi
= дb(i)x+ui = (дx )b(i) ∗ дui = yb(i) ∗vi .
This implies thatC never returns⊥, and thus returnsy = Fexp,д,q (x),
since
y = w0 ∗v0 = д
z0 ∗ дu0 = дx−u0 ∗ дu0 = дx .
The privacy property of the protocol against a malicious S fol-
lows, similarly as for the protocol in Section 3. Note that C's only
message to S is a tuple (z0, . . . , zm ) where z0 = (x − u0) mod q
and zi = (b(i) · x + ui ) mod q, for i = 1, . . . ,m. Here, values
u0,u(1), . . . ,u(m) are uniformly and independently distributed in
Zq , and thus so are z0, z(1), . . . , zm . This is the cases for any x
and for any b(1), . . . ,b(m) ∈ {1, . . . , 2λ
′
}. Thus, we obtain that the
protocol satisies the following two properties for all j = 0, . . . ,m:
(1) for any x , z0, z1, . . . , zm are uniformly and independently dis-
tributed inZq ; and (2) for anyx and anyb(1), . . . ,b(m) ∈ {1, . . . , 2
λ′},
values z0, z1, . . . , zm are uniformly and independently distributed
in Zq . Property (1) implies that C's message does not leak any in-
formation about x , and property (2) implies that C's message does
not leak any information about x and b(1), . . . ,b(m). The irst fact
suices to imply the privacy property. The second fact will be used
in the proof of the security property.
To prove the security property against a malicious S , we need
to compute an upper bound ϵs on the security probability that S
convinces C to output a y such that y , Fexp,д,q (x). If x = 0, C
can calculate Fexp,д,q (x) = д
0
= 1 and it does not need to check
whether S is honest or dishonest. Thus ϵs = 0 when x = 0. Now,
assume that x , 0. We start by deining the following events with
respect to a random execution of (C, S) where C uses x as input:
• ey,,, deined as ‘C outputs y such that y , Fexp,д,q (x)'
• e⊥, deined as ‘C outputs ⊥'
• e⊥,i , deined as ‘The valuewi sent by S does not satisfy the
i-th probabilistic check'
By inspection of (C, S), we directly obtain the following facts.
Fact 4.1. If event ey,, happens then event (¬ e⊥) happens.
Fact 4.2. If event ¬e⊥ happens then event ((¬ e⊥,1)∧ . . .∧(¬ e⊥,m ))
happens.
With respect to a random execution of (C, S) where C uses x as
input, we now deine the following events for all i = 1, . . . ,m:
• e1,b(i), deined as ‘∃ exactly one b(i) such that S's message
(w0, . . . ,wm ) satisieswi = (w0 ∗v0)
b(i) ∗vi '
• e>1,b(i), deined as ‘∃ more than one b(i) such that S 's mes-
sage (w0, . . . ,wm ) satisieswi = (w0 ∗v0)
b(i) ∗vi '.
By deinition, events e1,b(i), e>1,b(i) are each other's complement
event, for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
In our proof of the privacy property of (C, S), we proved that
for any x , C's message z0, z1, . . . , zm does not leak any informa-
tion about b(1), . . . ,b(m). By recalling that values b(1), . . . ,b(m)
are randomly and independently chosen by C , we obtain that all
values in {1, . . . , 2λ
′
} are still equally likely for each b(i) even
when conditioning over message (z0, z1, . . . , zm ) and over values
b(1), . . . ,b(i − 1). Then, for each i = 0, 1, . . . ,m, if event e1,b(i) is
true, the probability that values (w0,w1, . . . ,wm ) in S's message
satisfy the i-th probabilistic test, is 1 divided by the number 2λ
′
of
values of b(i) that are still equally likely even after conditioning
over message (z0, z1, . . . , zm ) and over values b(1), . . . ,b(i − 1).
We obtain the following
Fact 4.3. For all i = 1, . . . ,m, it holds that Prob [di | d1 ∧ . . . ∧ di−1 ] ≤
2−λ
′
, where di denotes event ¬ e⊥,i ∧ e1,b(i).
By applying the rule of conditional probability, we can write
Prob [d1 ∧ . . . ∧ dm ] =
m∏
i=1
Prob [di | d1 ∧ . . . ∧ di−1 ] .
By further using the result from Fact 4.3, and the expression λ′ =
⌈λ/m⌉, we obtain the following
Fact 4.4. It holds that Prob [d1 ∧ . . . ∧ dm ] ≤ 2
−λ , wheredi denotes
event ¬ e⊥,i ∧ e1,b(i), for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
We continue with the main technical claim, saying that if S is
malicious then it cannot produce in step 2 of the protocol values
w ′0, . . . ,w
′
m satisfying all ofC's three tests relatively to two distinct
values b1(i),b2(i) ∈ {1, . . . , 2
⌈
λ
m
⌉
} for each i = 1, . . . ,m:
Since S can be malicious, in step 2 it can send correct answer or
incorrect answer. Diferently saying, it can sendw ′j wherew
′
j = w j
orw ′j , w j wherewi = д
zj for each j = 0, . . .m. Since the groupG
is cyclic, д is generator ofG andC checks in step 3 thatw ′j ∈ G , we
can write
w ′j = д
α j ∗w j for some α j ∈ Zq for j = 0, . . . ,m
then y = w ′0 ∗v0 = д
α0 ∗w0 ∗v0 = д
α0 ∗дx . The goal of malicious S
to pass all three checks and C's output y , дx then α0 , 0 mod q.
Now, consider ‘probabilistic check' for each i = 1, . . . ,m:
w ′i = y
b(i) ∗vi
дαi ∗wi = (д
α0 ∗ дx )b(i) ∗ дui
дαi ∗ дzi = дα0b(i) ∗ дb(i)x+ui
дαi ∗ дb(i)x+ui = дα0b(i) ∗ дb(i)x+ui
дαi = дα0b(i)
αi = α0 · b(i) mod q
Notice that ifα0 = 0 mod q then αi = 0 mod q for all i = 1, . . . ,m
from above calculation which implies that S is honest then auto-
matically ϵs = 0. If αi = 0 mod q then α0 = 0 because b(i) , 0 for
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Now, if there exist some j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that
α j , 0, in this case we want to show that b(j) is unique. If there
exist two distinct b1(j) and b2(j) such that
α jb1(j) = α0 mod q and α jb2(j) = α0 mod q
then α j (b1(j) −b2(j)) = 0 mod q then b1(j) −b2(j) = 0 mod q (i.e
b1(j) = b2(j)) because α j , 0 mod q. Which shows that each b(i)
is unique for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
We obtain the following fact.
Fact 4.5. Prob
[
e>1,b(i)
]
= 0
The rest of the proof consists of computing an upper bound ϵs on
the probability of event ey,,. We have the following
Prob
[
ey,,
]
≤ Prob [ ¬ e⊥ ]
= Prob
[
¬ e⊥ ∧ (e1,b(1) ∧ . . . ∧ e1,b(m))
]
+ Prob
[
¬ e⊥ ∧ ¬(e1,b(1) ∧ . . . ∧ e1,b(m))
]
≤ Prob
[
(¬ e⊥,1 ∧ e1,b(1)) ∧ . . . ∧ (¬ e⊥,m ∧ e1,b(m))
]
+ Prob
[
¬ e⊥ ∧ (e>1,b(1) ∨ . . . ∨ e>1,b(m))
]
= Prob
[
(¬ e⊥,1 ∧ e1,b(1)) ∧ . . . ∧ (¬ e⊥,m ∧ e1,b(m))
]
+ Prob
[
(¬ e⊥ ∧ e>1,b(1)) ∨ . . . ∨ (¬ e⊥ ∧ e>1,b(m)))
]
≤
m∏
i=1
2−λ
′
+
m∑
i=1
Prob
[
¬ e⊥ ∧ e>1,b(i)
]
= (2−λ
′
)m +
m∑
i=1
Prob
[
e>1,b(i)
]
· Prob
[
¬ e⊥ |e>1,b(i)
]
=2−λ
where the above equalities and inequalities are explained as fol-
lows. The irst inequality is derived from Fact 4.1. The irst equality
follows from partitioning the event ¬ e⊥ into two disjoint events,
using the deinition of events e1,b(i), e>1,b(i). The second inequality
follows from Fact 4.2. The second equality is obtained by a distribu-
tive rule. The third inequality follows from Fact 4.4 and a union
bound. The third equality follows from the conditioning rule. The
last equality follows from Fact 4.5 and by the deinition of λ′.
We inally obtain that ϵs = Prob
[
ey,,
]
≤ 2−λ , which concludes
the proof of the security property for (C, S). □
5 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section we describe parametric (as a function of parameters
σ , λ,m) and numeric performance evaluations of our protocols in
Section 3, 4. We also compare these two protocols with the non-
outsourced computation of the same function.
So far we have expressed the performance of our protocols
in terms of group multiplications and two parameter functions:
texp (ℓ), the number of multiplications in G to compute one expo-
nentiation to an arbitrary ℓ-bit exponent; and tm,exp (ℓ), the number
of multiplications in G to computem exponentiations of the same
group value tom arbitrary ℓ-bit exponents. A more concrete eval-
uation of the performance of our protocols requires a (possibly
optimized) instantiation of these two functions. As there can be dif-
ferent algorithms for the computation of one exponentiation or of
m exponentiations of the same base tom arbitrary ℓ-bit exponents,
we opt for the following two representative istantiations:
(1) Basic setting: using the textbook square-and-multiply algo-
rithm to evaluate group exponentiation, and computingm
exponentiations by simply independently applying this same
algorithmm times, we can set
• texp (ℓ) = 2ℓ
• tm,exp (ℓ) = 2mℓ
(2) Improved setting: using improved algorithms from the lit-
erature to evaluate group exponentiation, we can obtain
even asymptotic improvements over the above expressions
in the basic setting. In particular, we use the improved algo-
rithms discussed in [27], which contains a detailed literature
account and closed-form estimates for the number of multi-
plications of the main discussed algorithms. We obtain that:
• texp (ℓ) is about ℓ(1+
1
log ℓ
), using Brauer's 1939 algorithm,
as described in [27],
• tm,exp (ℓ) is about ℓ(1+
m
log ℓ
), using Yao's 1976 algorithm,
as described in [27].
We also refer the reader to [7, 22, 28, 29] for other algorithms
claiming improvements, although note that these papers do
not provide additional closed-form evaluations.
The table below compares the performance of our outsourc-
ing protocols in Section 3 and Section 4 with a non-outsourced
computation of the client under both basic (B) and improved (I)
settings of functions texp , tm,exp . The table reports expressions (as
a function of σ , λ,m, λ′, for eiciency metrics tF (the number of
multiplications to compute function Fexp,д,q ), tP (the number of
multiplications used in the protocol's oline phase), tC (the num-
ber of multiplications by C in the protocol's online phase), tS (the
number of multiplications by S in the protocol's online phase), ϵp
(the probability parameter in the privacy deinition), and ϵs (the
probability parameter in the security deinition).
For simplicity of description, we only consider the case when
the group membership protocols do not add any multiplication (as
shown in Example 1 of Section 2, when G = Z∗p ).
Perf B/I
Fexp,д,q with
no Outsourcing
Fexp,д,q with Outsourcing
Section 3 Section 4
tF
B 2σ 2σ 2σ
I σ (1 + 1
logσ
) σ (1 + 1
logσ
) σ (1 + 1
logσ
)
tP
B 0 4σ 2σ (m + 1)
I 0 σ (1 + 2
logσ
) σ (1 + m+1
logσ
)
tC
B 2σ 2λ + 3 2mλ′ + 2m + 1
I σ (1 + 1
logσ
) λ(1 + 1
log λ
) + 3λ′(1 + m
log λ′
) + 2m + 1
tS
B 0 4σ 2σ (m + 1)
I 0 σ (1 + 2
logσ
) σ (1 + m+1
logσ
)
ϵp B & I 0 0 0
ϵs B & I 0 2
−λ 2−λ
Table 1: Parametric performance of our protocols.
The analysis for Example 2, whenG = Gq ⊆ Z
∗
p , for p = 2q + 1 and
p,q primes, is similarly obtained as it only addsm + 1 exponentia-
tions in G for S andm + 1 multiplications in G for C .
We believe the main takeaways by analyzing the expressions in the
above table are as follows:
• our protocol in Section 3 reduces tC by a multiplicative factor
of about σ/λ with respect to non-outsourced computation,
when using both basic and improved settings;
• the protocol in Section 4 reduces tC by a multiplicative factor
of: (1) about σ/λ with respect to non-outsourced computa-
tion, when using the basic parameter settings, and (2) about
σ/λ′ with respect to non-outsourced computation, when us-
ing the improved parameter settings, where λ′ = ⌈λ/m⌉ by
deinition, andm ≥ 1 can be chosen by the system designer;
• the protocol in Section 4 reduces tC by a multiplicative factor
of about λ/λ′ with respect to the protocol in Section 3, how-
ever by increasing parameters tP and tS by a multiplicative
factor of aboutm times, when using both basic and improved
settings;
• the impact of using basic or improved settings for functions
texp , tm,exp is only on lower-order terms of the performance
metrics tF , tP , tC , tS .
As for the numeric analysis, in Figure 1 and 2, we show the perfor-
mance of our protocols in Sections 3 (whenm = 1) and Section 4
(for anym ≥ 1). We set σ = 2048 and λ = 128, as these are the cur-
rently most recommended settings, and use the improved settings
for functions texp , tm,exp .
Figure 1 shows the number of multiplications by the client in
the online phase (tC ) asm increases, both in the Example 1 case
G = Z ∗p and in the Example 2 case G = Gq . We notice that in both
cases tC decreases asm increases up to 5, and then either keeps the
same value or increases for larger values ofm.
Figure 2 shows the server's number of multiplications in the
online phase (tS ) asm increases, both in the Example 1 caseG = Z
∗
p
and in the Example 2 caseG = Gq . We note that asm increases, this
Figure 1: Metric tC as a function ofm
metric monotonically increases in both cases, exhibiting a much
higher slope in the case G = Gq than in the case G = Z
∗
p . This
is because whenG = Gq , the eiciently veriiable group member-
ship protocol requiresm + 1 variable-base exponentiations from S ,
which we cannot optimize using improved algorithms (working on
multiple exponentiations on the same base).
As for metric tP , we note that in both Example 1 and Example 2
cases, it is equal to the (plotted) value of tS in the Example 1 case.
Interesting tradeof points, obtained by instantiating parameters
in the improved setting, are the following:
(1) G = Z∗p :m = 1, tC = 145, tP = tS = 2, 420, which minimizes
tS for Example 1;
(2) G = Z∗p :m = 5, tC = 65, tP = tS = 3, 165, which minimizes
tC for Example 1;
(3) G = Gq : m = 1, tC = 152, tP = 2, 420, tS = 4, 841, which
minimizes tS for Example 2;
(4) G = Gq : m = 5, tC = 71, tP = 3, 165, tS = 14, 523, which
minimizes tC for Example 2.
Finally, we considered benchmarks for modular multiplication
and exponentiation modulo a 2048-bit prime executed using com-
modity computing resources and extrapolated the running time of
tC whenm = 5 and G = Z
∗
p as just below 0.24ms and the running
time of tC whenm = 5 and G = Gq as just above 0.26ms.
6 CONCLUSIONS
We considered the problem of outsourcing group exponentiation
to a single, possibly malicious, server, originally left open in [20].
We solved this problem by showing protocols that provably satisfy
formal correctness, privacy, security and eiciency requirements,
in a large class of cyclic groups; speciically, cyclic groups whose
multiplication and inverse operations can be eiciently computed,
and which admit an eiciently veriiable protocol to prove that
an element is in the group. In the presented protocols, the prob-
ability that a cheating server convinces the client of an incorrect
computation result can be proved to be exponentially small. Pre-
vious best results could only achieve a constant probability. The
considered class of cyclic groups includes groups often discussed
in cryptography literature, such as
Figure 2: Metric tS as a function ofm
• Z∗p , for a large prime p, and
• Gq ⊆ Z
∗
p , for primes p,q such that p = 2q + 1.
Our methods suggest that expensive operations in many crypto-
graphic protocols (speciically, those basing their security on as-
sumptions related to the discrete logarithm problem in frequently
discussed groups) can be outsourced to a cloud server, with consid-
erable savings on client computation (e.g., by performing about 70
group multiplications instead of 1 group exponentiation).
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